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BY E. T. BREWSTER
NOT all people who believe that miracles occur, will agree as
to v.'liat a miracle is. Still less will they agree as to the
nature of non-miracle. Nevertheless, everybody seems to take
it for granted that "non-miraculous" events are completely un-
derstood. All we have to do is to accounts for events of the other
sort which we call "miraculous." But the problem is by no
means so simple.
One point, however, everybody seems agreed on. A miracle
is always "a violation of Natural Law," or else it is a case of a
"higher Natural Law" "interfering with" or "setting aside" a
"lower." L>ut a non-miracle is thought to occur "by the opera-
tion of Nacural Laws" and so does not have to be discussed at all.
It all sounds very sim])le—until one reflects that "natural law"
is itself a highly ambiguous term, that has at least three distinct
meanings. If one confuses these meanings, still more if one jumps
back and lorth rapidly from one meaning to another, one can
spin out a long argument either for or against "miracles," accord-
ing to the side he happens to choose. So the whole problem really
turns on what one really means when he says "law of nature."
He may ha\e in mind—though commonly he docs not—an
old pre-scientific folk sense, an epigramatic summing up of folk
ex])erience : All men are mortal; water seeks its level; a straight
line is the shortest distance between two points ; honesty is the
best i)olicy. All these statements are true as a matter of general
commonplace observation. But nobody maintains that they are
in any wise universally or absolutely true, so that, for example,
dishonesty might not prove efficient under some conditions and
a straight line take on unexpected properties in non-Euclidean
space.
This is the sense of "law of nature" in Hume's Essay on Miracles.
And of course, there goes with it the corresponding sense of "mir-
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acle." It has always been a simple matter to refute "St. David" by
pretending that he is using the two words in some other of their
various meanings. But "law of nature," in this sense has neither
scientific nor philosophical nor theological standing. It simply is a
formulatioti of folk experience ; the perfectly naive interpretation
of things as they appear. Such laws of nature arc necessarily "vio-
lated" whenever anything unusual happens.
In sharp contrast to this meaning is another, which like a good
many of oui important ideas we owe chiefly to Roman stoicism.
The universe, for the Stoic, is an original and self-existent chaos,
which, at least in part, has been subdued to order by the divine
logos. In other words, God orders the aflr'airs of the cosmos very
much as the Roman emj^eror orders the affairs of the civilized world.
The Emperor issues edicts, and men obey. God lays down "laws"
which "govern" the operations of nature. So far. then, as nature
is rational and orderly it obeys these specific regulations of the
divine reason.
But this idea of "law" as something imposed upon "matter" by
the word of God, is evidently a very long step beyond the folk mean-
ing of the same word. This says merely: things commonly hap-
pen thus and so. Probably they will happen the same way again.
But maybe they will not. Who knows? As Hume put it, in efl:'ect,
things have happened thus and so, with so few exceptions, if any,
that it becomes the safer bet that people who think they happen
otherwise are mistaken. But there is nowhere any idea of neces-
sity or compulsion or any will of God to make anything happen one
way or another. But the Stoic idea makes the whole affair much
more serious. God has laid down the "law." The universe obeys.
Only he who made the law can alter it. This is a noble idea ; but
like the other, it is quite pre-scientific.
It has persisted unchanged all down through the Christian ages
to the present time. St. Augustine, for example, has "God the
maker of all natures . . . from whom is all the law and number
and order of nature." Spinoza especially played up the idea. Kep-
ler is quoted as saying of his three Laws of Planetary Motion, "I
think God's thoughts after him." Kepler was pre-Xewtonian, and
having virtually no idea at all of what we now call "mechanical
causation." thought that the planets are carried round the sun by
angels. His three famous laws, therefore, were literally verbal
orders issued to the angels of the moon and earth and planets to
act precisely so and so, until further notice.
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One sees the same idea daily in all sorts of forms. "The laws
of nature presuppose a Law-Giver." "God cannot be bound by his
own laws.'' "The reign of Natural Law." Or as an eminent Mod-
ernist preacher puts it—he does not believe in miracles, but he has
the pre-scientific idea of "law"— "I cannot believe that the laws of
nature were ever violated ; for the simple reason that God himself
has taught me, as he is teaching all our sons and daughters in every
modern university of the western world today that these laws are
immutable throughout eternity. . . ."
The fallacy is, of course, obvious. Nobody has any possible way
of finding out whether 'these laws" in the scientific sense of "laiv"
are or are not "immutable throughout eternity." The oldest of
them has been checked up for only al)OUt three hundred years, which
is a long wsy short of eternity. No law of science is known to hold
exactly, and not a few of them have had to be abandoned because
they have proved not to work at all. The trouble is that our eminent
divine, like many another of his fellows, uses "law of nature" in the
old Stoic sense ; and then transfers this idea to scientific people, as
if they use "law" in this Stoic sense— as they never do.
For the scientific meaning of "law of nature" ties u]j with the
folk meaning of the word, not with the Stoic. A law of science, in
the modern sense, is a formula, usually in mathematical terms, by
means of which we can ])redict, often with a high degree of accuracy,
what is mrst likely to happen in the future. "The entire task of
science," writes the great chemist Ostwald, "is to establish such
relations between measurable quantities that, some of these quanti-
ties being given, the others may be deduced." The laws of science
are the technical de\-ices. continually being expanded and improved,
by which this end is more and more completely attained. Or as an
uncommonly clear-headed theologian, puts it, "Where as law was
once thought of as a restraint imposed upon the universe from
without and wielding an absolute power over nature, it is now
thought of simply as our description of the behavior of phenomena."
See, then, what nonsense it makes when one attributes to scien-
tific people the theological meaning of "natural law," and then inter-
prets their language as if they really did ever use the term in that
sense ! Thi. divine quoted above, having occasion to rebuke his
bishop for his ignorance of modern ideas, went on to point out the
impossibility that a human body which "weighed, let us say, one
hundred and fifty pounds," could promenade the surface of the
Sea of Galilee, "in utter defiance of the law of gravitation."
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But the only "law of qravitation" that science knows anything
about is the algebraic formula F = -
—
7^— . The great Sir Isaac
first wrote this out, and it proves most convenient for reckoning the
time of the next eclipse, and the dates of Easter, and the weight of
distant binary stars, and various other things that various persons
want to know. But it does not cause eclipses nor Easter Sundays
nor make the stars spin round. Therefore nobody can "defy" it.
In fact, one does not "defy" anything algebraic. One defies bishops.
Besides, the Relativists think the law of gravitation isn't true any-
way !
A\'liat the Doctor of Divinitv really means is that everybody, as
a matter of folk experience, has to reckon with the force of gravity.
Nobodv really knows in the least why a human body which weighs,
"let us say. a hundred and fifty pounds"—or even two hundred
and fifty, for that matter—commonly sinks when it tries to walk
on water, nor whv it commonly does not sink when it walks on ice.
But there is the general experience of the force of gravity. Newton
analyzed, mathematically, our primitive folk idea of force. He set
forth his highly important theory of Universal Gravitation, which
has proved to fit a considerable number of facts, is part of conven-
tional science, and may very well be true. He also formulated and
tested his laze of Gravitation, for the convenience of people who
want to predict eclipses, date Easter Sunday, and the rest. But the
"Law of Gravitation" has nothing to do with anybody's sinking in
water. That misfortune can be accurately described in terms of
gravity and Archimedes' Law and Pascal's Law. and various other
scientific technicalities, none of which have the slightest bearing on
the practical question. One simply sinks. Nobody knows why. All
the "laws" do is to enable scientific people to tell without trying just
what will sink and what will not, and how fast and how far. None
of them have any "control" over anything. Our Modernist divine
merely dragged in his Law of Gravitation by the ears, to make him-
self sound scientific, and to add another zest to the popular but cruel
sport of bishop bating.
Aliracles. in short, are "violations of natural law" only in the
Stoic and theological sense of "natural law." The "laws of science"
have no bearing on the matter at all. Questions of "force" in the
scientific sense, may be involved. So also may questions of "mat-
ter." also in the scientific sense. We are continually discovering
new properties of "matter" and we are continually gaining new con-
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trol over "force." So one has always to use his judgment when
confronted with a story of a new scientific achievement or an old
miracle. But "law" in the scientific sense, is never involved in the
credibility of any alleged "miracle" but only "law" in the theologi-
cal sense.
Many a time, then, has the scientific world wished it had taken
some other word than "law" for its predictive formulas, and let the
clergy have the term to themselves. But the harm being done, the
best we can make of a bad matter is to confine "natural law" and
"law of nature" to the old Stoic compulsory sense, and to say "law
of science" whenever we mean any one of the two or three hundred
brief summaries of the facts of observation which we see in the sci-
entific reference books.
In other words, this whole problem of miracles and non-miracles
is entirely factitious. Events simply are. Nobody knows why.
I sit down to my typewriter and think "A." Forthwith, the
proper finger hits the "A" key. But has anybody the remotest idea
how a mental state operates to alter the position of bodies in the
outer world? A recent discussion proposes to call this performance
d miracle. Well, of course it is, in the sense that it is "a material
change dictated by mind" and nobody knows how the trick is done.
That is a perfectly good definition of "miracle"—only, where shall
one look for a non-miracle ?
But when I hit the "A" key, the "force"—whatever that may
mean—sets in operation sundry springs and levers, until the letter
prints. But no mortal know's why one body moves another, any
more than he knows how- an idea in his thought stream moves a
body. The finger goes through the air ; and it does not go through
the key. The key is a rigid bar that is deformed inappreciably ; and
the ink ribbon is flexible and buckles under a like stress. These, I
understand, are not miracles. But why not? Nobody has any idea
whatever, why air and steel and silk do not behave alike.
All events, in short, are alike incomprehensible. Doubtless it is
remarkable that the twig of a pair tree grafted on an apple, should
still bear pears and not apples. But it is equally remarkable that
trees growing out of the ground should bear either apples or pears
instead of stones. Doubtless it is amazing that staves, cast from the
hands of Pharaoh's magicians should alter instantly into serpents.
But it is e(|ually amazing that serpents eggs, let alone, should come
slowly to a like end. It is all a cjuestion of what one is used to see-
ing and what one can prove to have happened.
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Events, in other words, difler in frequency and in predictability.
There is not the least evidence that they differ in their ultimate
cause.
Rut now comes along the theologian and wants to put in a purely
artificial division of events into miraculous and non-miraculous.
Having done this, quite wantonly, he then finds himself needing
deliverance cut of six troubles, because he has to define his two cate-
gories, discover some difference between them, and explain their
relation. If only he had not made the division in the first place,
then the resulting difficulties would not be plaguing him now.
Xot satisfied with making himself all this quite useless trouble,
the theologian persists in adding to it by dragging in "the laws of
science," w'hich have nothing Avhatever to do with the matter. Hav-
ing by this device manufactured a fresh set of factitious difficulties,
he adds these on to—rather he multiplies these by— whatever dif-
ficulties arise from his own quite different meaning of the term.
But why drag in "the laws of science" at all? If anybodv thinks
that God, as an all-wise being, will not lay down a "law" in the
first place and then alter it, that is a purely theological question, on
which natural science has absoutely nothing whatever to say on
either side. And if anybody thinks that God, as all-powerful, can
always do as he likes with his universe and "is not bound by his
own laws," that is also a purely theological question, on which, once
more, natural science has absolutely nothing to say on either side.
It is, therefore, most absurd to say, as is so often said in all
sorts of forms, by people who ought to know better, that "Science
denies the possibility of miracle." What scientific people deny—
wliat scientific people must always deny— is the possibility of non-
miracle.
That is to say, if one insists on thinking of a commonplace and pre-
sumably non-miraculous event as caused by "the operation of nat-
ural law"—or however else one chooses to express this widely
prevalent idea—and if, in addition, one attaches to the term "law"
the meaning that it has in every scientific textbook, then every sci-
entific person in the world must of necessity make one reply: Any
non-miraculous event, as so defined, is not only impossible, but
unthinkable.
There are no non-miracles. A\'hether there are miracles, turns
entirely on how one defines the word.
